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Abstract
We develop, and experimentally test, a behavioral model of deal-
making which includes binding contracts and informal agreements as
distinct but related special cases. The key assumptions: people are
mostly honest; they su¤er costs of overcoming temptation to renege;
and they tend to split gains down the middle.
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1 Introduction
Bargaining theory, e.g. building on Nash (1950, 1953), focuses on binding
contracts. Less attention has been given to informal (non-binding) agree-
ments. A likely reason is that if people maximize own income, a common
assumption, then there is limited scope for informal agreements to have im-
pact.1 A selsh agent would simply renege if this were in his interest.
Humans have tendencies that curb such opportunism. Successful entre-
preneur Karl Eller, for example, wrote his book Integrity Is All Youve Got
(2005) in which that message is clear. One can justify a preference for hon-
esty with reference to repetition or reputation, but that cannot be the whole
story. Eller writes about the happiness that comes with knowing youll never
be ashamed to face yourself in the mirror (p. 103). Indeed, experiments
indicate that honesty matters even in non-repeat settings with anonymity
guaranteed. For example, Kessler & Leider (2012) nd that subjects who
were o¤ered an opportunity to enter an informal agreement often did so and
then delivered although they could have protably reneged.2
We propose that people are mainly honest, and o¤er a theory of deal-
making which treats informal agreements and binding contracts as special
cases. Honest folk have much to gain by striking informal agreements. Bind-
ing contracts may be infeasible (e.g. in developing countries with unreliable
courts), illegal (e.g. for cartelists), or costly (e.g. nuptials). This begs ques-
tions regarding the shape and impact of informal agreements, and how they
compare with binding contracts. Our theory delivers predictions.
Assuming that honesty is prevalent does not imply that informal agree-
ments and binding contracts look the same. We highlight two reasons. First,
1Informal agreements may allow Pareto improvements in games with multiple equilib-
ria; see e.g. MacLeod & Malcolmson (1989), McCutcheon (1997), Levin (2003).
2Irlenbusch (2004), Ben-Ner & Putterman (2009), and (from social psychology) Malho-
tra & Murnighan (2002) present related results. Several studies have to boot shown that
people may have preferences to not deceive or to honor promises. See for example, Kerr
& Kau¤man-Gilliland (1994), Ellingsen & Johannesson (2004), Gneezy (2005), Charness
& Dufwenberg (2006), Vanberg (2008), and Servátka, Tucker & Vadoviµc (2011).
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lots of research indicates that humans su¤er cognitive costs when ghting
temptations.3 An honest person fulls the terms he agrees to, and yet he
may not be immune to costs incurred when overcoming temptation to re-
nege. The anticipation may a¤ect his evaluation of what deals are worth
striking. Second, while we assume most people are honest, we do not assume
all are. When deciding whether to enter an informal agreement, a party takes
account of the costs associated with opportunistic counter-part behavior.
Apart from responding to these costs we propose that informal agreements
look like binding contracts. So how do binding contracts look? Classical bar-
gaining theory provides answers. However, we are skeptical of the relevance
of this scholarship for describing the behavior of honest people. Much of
classical theory assumes players know each othersutilities. As an empirical
proposition this was questioned early on  Luce & Rai¤a (1957, p. 134)
nd it extremely doubtfulbut over time scholars seem to have not wor-
ried too much. Again this may be because economists often accept the idea
that utility equals (or is monotone in) own money, making the issue largely
moot. However, for honest deal-makers own monetary gain is not all that
matters. More generally, modern research on social preferences shows that
people often care not only about their own monetary rewards. Experimen-
tal research has revealed many insights regarding what people care about
instead; nevertheless there is a lot of debate and little consensus.4
If human motivation is complicated, rich, and hard-to-pin-down in math-
ematical formulae, perhaps one should not be surprised if humans strike
deals that refer to readily observable data like dollars earned? Indeed, many
agreements often simply divide dollar gains equally.5 We assume that bind-
ing contracts have this property. We then propose that informal agreements
3See Benartzi & Thaler (2004), Brown, Chua & Camerer (2009), and Martinsson,
Myrseth & Wollbrant (2012) for experiments and Thaler & Shefrin (1981), Gul & Pe-
sendorfer (2001), Loewenstein & ODonoghue (2005), Fudenberg & Levine (2006), Salant,
Silverman & Ozdenoren (2011), and Lipman & Pesendorfer (2011) for theory.
4For surveys, see Camerer (2003) and Fehr & Schmidt (2006).
5See, e.g., Andreoni & Bernheim (2010) or Binmore, Shaked & Sutton (1989).
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work the same way except that new participation constraints enter the pic-
ture to take into account costs of temptation and co-player opportunism.
The framework in which we formulate these statements precisely is game-
theoretic and structured as follows:
1. An agreement, be it binding or informal, may be reached by a group
of players about to play a game.
2. The object of negotiation concerns which strategy prole to play.
3. If the agreement is binding then the players have to play accordingly.
4. If the agreement is informal then the players still have to play the game.
5. If no agreement is reached then the players still have to play the game.
A key feature here is the explicit anchoring on an underlying game
that has to be played. This allows us to be explicit about the nature of
the economic situation in which an agreement may be struck, and it allows
informal agreements to be truly non-binding, since post-agreement the game
must still be played. The approach is, however, not idiosyncratic to informal
agreements; as seen in 1-3 & 5, it allows for binding contracts as well.
The underlying game does not describe the playershaggling. Agreement-
formation is instead captured implicitly, through a solution-concept: Let S
be the set of strategy proles in the underlying game. We select a; b; c 2 S
such that a is the agreement, b is the behavior following the agreement, and
c the conict outcome that would happen if the players failed to agree. Our
predictions are formulated in terms of restrictions on a; b; and c.
In envisaging agreements as strategy proles we connect to a classic tra-
dition. Von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944) approach all games other than
two-player zero-sum ones with this outlook (see e.g. pp. 223-4). Nash (1953)
assumes players strike binding contracts regarding which strategy prole to
play in some underlying game, and before negotiations start they announce
threats (strategies) which an umpire forces them to implement if they
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subsequently fail to reach an agreement.6 We share the outlook that strat-
egy proles are objects of negotiation, but neither limit attention to binding
contracts nor presuppose access to an umpire.7
The contribution of our paper has two parts. Developing the theory is #1.
Whats next? One option would be to explore applications, say prenups, car-
tel collusion, auction bidding rings, political logrolling, or diplomacy. How-
ever, it seems premature to spend such e¤ort before one has direct evidence
that the theorys key features make empirical sense. Our contribution part
#2 reports on an experiment designed to provide a relevant testbed.
Sections 2, 3, & 4 present theory, experiment, & concluding remarks.
2 Theory
This section describes and interprets the game-theoretic framework (2.1) and
develops our solution concept (2.2).
2.1 General Framework
Our analysis of a bargaining scenario starts with a two-player extensive game
form   with given material/dollar payo¤s specied at end nodes. Let Si be
player is set of strategies (taken to be singleton if i owns no information set),
and S = S1  S2. Let mi : S ! R be is dollar-payo¤-from-strategy-prole
function, derived from  . Well write mi(sns0j) to indicate is dollar payo¤ if
j unilaterally deviates from s = (si; sj) to use s0j instead of sj.
6See Kalai (1977) and Kalai & Tauman Kalai (2010) for more work in this vein.
7The cheap talk literature (see e.g. Crawford & Sobel 1982, Farrell & Rabin 1996) also
studies the e¤ect of communication in games. Unlike our approach, cheap talk is modeled
as explicit choices and, most importantly, presumed not to a¤ect preferences (over strategy
proles) in the underlying game. By contrast, in our approach players have a preference for
playing as they agree, so talk is not cheap. There is also the game-theoretic literature on
communication equilibria (e.g. Forges 1986, Myerson 1986), which (like us) captures the
e¤ect of messages through solution concepts but (like the cheap talk literature) assumes
communication does not a¤ect preferences over strategy proles.
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This underlying game   describes the strategic structure of a situation
where two persons just metand face some opportunity of collaboration for
mutual gain. The payo¤s represent dollar increments relative to whatever
wealth the two had before. If someone gets a payo¤ of 0 when the underly-
ing game is played, we interpret this to mean that his overall dollar wealth
remains the same as if he had never met the other player.
We assume that the underlying game allows enough opportunities for
the players to transfer money between each other that they can achieve the
following: Let H denote the highest sum of the playersdollar payo¤s at any
endnode in  . We assume that H > 0 and that if $1; $2  0 and $1+$2 = H
then   admits some endnode with dollar payo¤s ($1; $2). This implies, among
other things, that   allows innite choice sets and that there is a way to play
  that results in equal dollar payo¤s for each player.
We assume that   is a multi-stage game form with observed actions (see
Fudenberg & Tirole 1991, Chapter 3), so that all instances of imperfect in-
formation concern simultaneous choices. This restriction simplies the key
denitions below by allowing us to refer to subgames in a useful way, with-
out essentially compromising the scope of the model since most applied and
experimental work is concerned with such games.
The players haggle about which strategy prole to play.   does not give
an explicit description of this process. Rather, we capture its e¤ect through
a solution concept with a special structure. An agreement, which may be
formal or informal, takes the form of a strategy prole which we denote
a 2 S. Of course, a also describes o¤-path play. The interpretation di¤ers
depending on whether a is an informal agreement or a binding contract. In
the former case the o¤-path part of a reects the playersagreed upon under-
standing, presumably obtained through the un-modeled haggling process, of
what would happen following any deviation. In the latter case the o¤-path
part of a should be neglected since the involved choices are inconceivable
(think of a as representative of the equivalence class of strategy proles that
generate the same path).
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When the negotiation phase is over the players have to play the game.
What will they do? Our framework asks for specication of two more strategy
proles b 2 S and c 2 S. b describes what actually happens in the game
after agreement a is struck and c describes what would happen if negotiation
failed. b and c also describe o¤-path play, again interpreted as reecting
the playersagreed upon understanding of what would happen following any
possible deviation.8
Several clarifying comments are warranted. First, we theorize only about
what happens when negotiations generate agreements. c should thus be
understood counter-factually; it describes what would happen had a not oc-
curred, given that a does occur. As we shall see below it is possible that
in some game no deal (a; b; c) exists which satises the postulated proper-
ties. The interpretation is that no agreement would be reached in that case.
We o¤er no explicit prediction for play following such non-counterfactual
negotiation-breakdown.
Second, with binding contracts b = a by denition, but with non-binding
agreements it is conceivable that b 6= a. Third, as regards c, one could
imagine a richer structure such that c depend on how negotiations stranded
(e.g., which player caused the break down). We abstract away from such
nuances. Fourth, we interpret o¤-path parts of a; b; c as reecting common
understanding by all players regarding o¤-path behavior. One could imagine
alternatives, e.g., as in a self-conrming equilibrium (Fudenberg & Levine
1993; cf. Greenberg 2000). We do not do so in this paper.
Fifth, we elucidate why we do not explicitly model the strategic structure
of the pre-play negotiation. Consider the example in Figure 1, where 1 <
X < 3, which comes with a story:
Player 1 is hospital and player 2 is an employed radiologist. A new radiog-
raphy technique has been made available, and at the root 1 decides whether
to Invest or Not invest in costly training for 2 to learn the new methods.
8With binding agreements b = a and o¤-path play is by denition not possible so (as
with a) the o¤-path part of b should be neglected in this case.
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Figure 1: Hospital-Doctor game
In the former case 2 becomes more productive but also more attractive to
other hospitals; choice Leave with subsequent payo¤s reects what happens
if 2 resigns and takes employment at Johns Hopkins. That would be bad for
1 who stands to gain if 2 instead Continues at the current job. In that case,
1 can choose what wage w 2 [0; 3] to pay 2, thereby determining 1s life-time
income.9
The point of this example is that the game, like many others, can describe
a somewhat meaningful situation where deals can be made. However, that
situation also seems unrealistically barren, as it incorporates no opportunities
for wage negotiation, promises, threats, etc. A more meaningful situation
would arguably be the same one augmented so that the players can meet and
strike agreements regarding whether player 1 should pay for the training, and
what player 2s pension should be.
How should one model such considerations? How should one make pre-
9The implicit assumption is that later in 2s life he has fewer outside opportunities and
is therefore vulnerable to hold-up.
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dictions? One possibility may be to change the game, to include every o¤er,
every counter-o¤er, every promise, every threat, every signing on a dotted
line, etc., as explicit choices in a larger game. But that game is likely to get
unmanageable. The playersstrategy sets would be very complex. It may be
intractable to apply an adequate solution concept. It is against this back-
drop that we propose our approach. It is reminiscent of cooperative game
theory in that we do not model every aspect of the negotiation, yet it is
non-cooperative in that the strategic structure of the situation to which we
add a negotiation possibility is allowed to inuence our analysis.
What agreements may one expect to occur? That depends on many
things, including the nature of the playersmotivation, whether the agree-
ment is binding or non-binding, and game details such as X. We propose a
generally applicable theory next.
2.2 The Model
What psychological and economic principles determine a deal (a; b; c) 2 S3?
Many answers are conceivable. We propose a particular one, as follows:
c 2 S : Selsh SPE
Before we describe the agreement (a 2 S) and post-agreement behavior
(b 2 S), let us ponder what would have happened should negotiations fail
(c 2 S). We assume that players would behave selshly in the sense that c
is a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of   using the dollar payo¤s.
This assumption is not obvious, as it is known from many studies that
players are often not selsh (cf. footnote 4). However, we justify the as-
sumption as follows: On the one hand, in many game forms (e.g. prisoners
dilemmas or trust games or public goods games) that exhibit a tension be-
tween individual and collective dollar-payo¤-maximization, subjects manage
to reach e¢ cient outcomes. This suggests that players often appreciate the
well-being of others. On the other hand, it does not seem unreasonable to
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suppose that players who do not manage to agree would end up being irri-
tated with one another. All in all, it seems unclear whether c 2 S should
reect that players would be friendly or hostile towards one another. Our
assumption that players would act selshly takes a middle road.10
b  a: Pacta sunt servatka
With a binding contract, b = a by denition. Informal agreements, on
the other hand, are not explicitly enforced. We assume that if an informal
agreement a 2 S is struck, most players i honor the agreement and choose
bi = ai. Some economists may nd this assumption extreme. Our experiences
from life as well as readings of related literature (cited in the introduction,
including footnote 2) tell us it actually makes sense. It is indeed a stark
antidote to the more typical economistsassumption that people are selsh.
But ultimately it is an empirical question whether most people are honest,
one than can be experimentally tested and potentially rejected.
Honest behavior can be actually justied with reference to a variety of
social preferences. For example, if one thinks of informal agreements as
embodying a process where players make promises, then several authors have
suggested that players may prefer to keep promises or (more generally) not
to have lied.11 One may alternatively imagine that players simply obey some
social norm that says that one should honor agreements.12 Or players could
be guilt averse, inclined not to hurt others relative to their expectations;13
negotiation may then foster common and self-fullling beliefs that an informal
agreement will be honored. Honesty may also be backed up by reciprocity,
if the agreed on strategy prole plus correct beliefs imply that the players
10Note that there is scant data to guide our modeling choice: existing data on the
relevance of social preferences typically neither concern games played after negotiations
break down nor concern what would happen after counter-factual negotiation breakdown.
11See the references in footnote 2 (except Malhotra & Murnighan) plus Demichelis &
Weibull (2008) and Kartik (2009).
12See Malhotra & Murnighan, Kessler & Leider, and Miettinen (2011).
13See e.g. Charness & Dufwenberg (2006), Battigalli & Dufwenberg (2007).
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are kind to one another.14 Or players may be uncertain about the nature
of their own preferences and stick with the agreement to avoid negative self-
signalling.15 While it is an interesting issue to determine which motivational
story may be most empirically relevant, in this paper we just assume that
agreements are mostly honored.
What choices should one expect from those who renege? Are they per-
haps spiteful and minimize others payo¤s? Do they trade o¤ their own gain
against the loss of their co-players? While these possibilities do not seem
unreasonable, we shall assume that renegers are selsh and maximize their
own payo¤. This way we obtain fairly easy to state denitions and a clear
benchmark to test with data.
a 2 S : Equal gains
Recall our remarks from the introduction regarding classical bargain-
ing theory: While that scholarship is conceptually related to our (a; b; c)-
approach, it is of questionable applied relevance as regards the behavior of
honest individuals. Most classical models presume that utilities are com-
monly known, but modern research on social preferences has in our view
made it clear that utilities are nowhere near commonly known. Is it not rea-
sonable, then, that bargainers give scant reference to such complicated, rich,
and hard-to-pin-down notions? Is it not likely that they instead strike deals
that, most of the time, refer to readily observable data like dollars gained?
Even if dollar gains is the object of negotiation it is not obvious which
split is most likely. Di¤erent contexts may trigger di¤erent thinking. In
an intriguing recent paper, Isoni, Poulsen, Sugden & Tsutsui (2011) discuss
Schellings (1960) idea that outcomes under tacit bargaining (where commu-
nication is incomplete or impossible) may depend on focal points which in
turn may depend on cues such as object proximity, existing location of bar-
gaining parties, salience of geographical boundaries (e.g. a river), precedence
14See Rabin (1993), Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger (2004), Falk & Fischbacher (2006).
15See Benabou & Tirole (2002).
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of supply chains, or a historical consumer base. Isoni et al experimentally
test Schellings theory and nd support. We suggest that these ideas may
naturally extend beyond tacit bargaining, to explicit haggling, which is our
focus. That said, while it would seem an exciting long run goal to merge the
ideas of Schelling + Isoni et al with our framework, in this paper we focus
on a simpler norm which may nevertheless be very relevant in many contexts
(that perhaps lack salient locations, rivers, or historical antecedents): 50/50
splits.
Andreoni & Bernheim (2010, p. 1607) reference a variety of studies docu-
menting prevalence of equal splits of dollar gains (e.g. joint ventures between
corporations, share tenancy in agriculture, bequests to children, negotiation
and arbitration, business partners splitting earnings from joint projects, or
friends splitting tabs). Some experiments point in the same direction. Bin-
more, Shaked & Sutton (1989) let subjects bargain over sums of money. If
one of the parties breaks the negotiations both get prespecied outside op-
tion payo¤s. It turns out that these do not inuence the agreements, except
as imposing lower bounds on what each party will get. The money is simply
split equally, as long as each party at least gets his outside option. Binmore
et al call this a deal-me-out solution.16
Our solution may be viewed as a version of deal-me-out. It modies or
adds to Binmore et als notion in two ways: First, we assume that the object
of the negotiation is a strategy prole (a 2 S) rather than a sum of money.
Second, we do not restrict attention to binding contracts but also consider
informal agreements.
We propose that deals generate equal dollar payo¤s, as long as each player
i is made no worse o¤ than when play proceeds according to c 2 S. If the
deal involves a binding contract then what this means is straightforward: i
is made no worse o¤ if mi(a)  mi(c). (Think of mi(c) as the counterpart
in our theory to Binmore et als outside option for i.)
16For further evidence supporting deal-me-out, see Binmore, Proulx, Samuelson &
Swierzbinski (1998) and (much less conclusively) Feltovich & Swierzbinski (2011).
11
If the deal involves an informal agreement then it is not as obvious
whether or not i is made no worse o¤ relative to c 2 S. There are (at least)
two reasons. First, there are the dishonest individuals who renege. Suppose
that player i believes that with probability "i > 0 his co-player j will renege
and choose selshly; let the relevant strategy be s^j 2 arg maxsj2Sj mj(ansj).17
Then is expected dollar payo¤ under an informal agreement will be lower
than with the same agreement under a binding contract. If the di¤erence is
big enough, i may accept an equal-split inducing a 2 S as a binding contract
but not as an informal agreement.
A second factor complicating how a player evaluates whether or not he
is made no worse o¤ concerns the temptations to renege that he has to
overcome if he honors an informal agreement. There is a sizable literature
on human tendency to resist temptations.18 It is often argued that humans
can overcome temptation, but that this comes at a cost. If player i considers
such costs when evaluating an informal agreement, then his subjective dollar
gain (i.e., net of the temptation cost) under an informal agreement will be
lower than with the same strategy prole as a binding contract. Again, if
the di¤erence is big enough, i may accept a 2 S as a binding contract but
not as an informal agreement.
How should one calculate costs of overcoming temptation to renege? Are
they linear or perhaps convex in how much a player may gain (cf. Fudenberg
& Levine 2006 who discuss both versions)? Are they stochastic (cf. Dekel &
Lipman 2011)? Do they depend on how many times along a path a player
is tempted (cf. Salant, Silverman & Ozdenoren 2011), or does only the
17This formulation assumes a selsh player j does not take into account the possibility
that his co-player reneges too, a feature we could easily change with little conceptual gain,
much added complexity, and no importance in many games incl. those of Sect. 4.
18See the references in footnote 3. The literature mainly focuses on single decision
maker settings (Loewenstein & ODonoghues section VI is an exception), not temptation
to renege and hurt a co-player as we have, but that extension seems very plausible to
us. Indeed, Martinsson et al reports support for the proposition that individuals may
experience a self-control conict between the temptation to act selshly and the better
judgment to act pro-socially.
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maximum temptation along the path matter? Are they moderated to the
extent that reneging hurts others (cf. Gneezy 2005), or even via some nuanced
notion of empathy(ODonoghue & Loewenstein 2005)? The answers are
by no means obvious. We go with the following straightforward version that
allows us to state denitions fairly easily. The cost of overcoming temptation
is proportional to the maximum foregone dollar gains from reneging; let the
proportional factor of player i be i > 0.19 With an informal agreement, is
cost-of-temptation associated with a 2 S equals
i  (max
si2Si
mi(ansi) mi(a)):
With a binding contract, by contrast, temptation-costs equal zero; there
cannot be any reneging on a binding contract, hence no temptation-cost.
We next give denitions that formally pin down, respectively, binding
contracts and informal agreements. We then o¤er further comments on in-
terpretation and predicted di¤erences.
 A binding contract (BC) a 2 S satises two conditions:
BC(i) for i = 1; 2 and some M > 0 we have
mi(a) = maxfM; mi(c)g;
BC(ii) M is the largest number for which BC(i) holds.
 An informal agreement (IA) a 2 S satises three conditions:
19We adopt notation i from Fudenberg & Levine. Their Assumption 5makes a com-
parable linearity assumption.
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IA(i) for i = 1; 2 and some M > 0 we have
mi(a) = maxfM; mi(c) + i[max
si2Si
mi(ansi) mi(a)]
+ "i[mi(a) mi(ans^j)]g;
where i; "i > 0 and s^j 2 arg maxsj2Sj mj(ansj),
IA(ii) M is the largest number for which IA(i) holds,
IA(iii) o¤its induced path, a prescribes SPE-play using the dollar payo¤s.
Condition BC(i) is our take on deal-me-out for binding contracts; players
simply split dollar payo¤s equally, unless someone would then get less than
he would at c. BC(ii) is an e¢ ciency condition such that no money is left on
the table; obviously M = maxa2S[m1(a) +m2(a)].
Condition IA(i) captures the deal-me-out idea for informal agreements.
Comparing with BC(i), one sees that is participation constraintbecomes
tighter; he now needs to get not only mi(c) but also be compensated for
the costs of overcoming temptation and of co-player opportunism.20 Note
that if i; "i ! 0 then IA(i) approaches BC(i). In this sense, relative to
informal agreements, binding contracts switch o¤the costs of temptation
and opportunism. IA(ii) is again an e¢ ciency condition, but this time it
may be that M < maxa2S[m1(a) + m2(a)] (the reader may verify this by
constructing an example). IA(iii) is an assumption about play after a player
reneges,21 analogous to what lead us to assume that c 2 S is a subgame
perfect equilibrium using the dollar payo¤s.
20IA(i) reects the idea that player i factors in temptation costs evaluated with respect
to a fully honest opponent, independently of "i. This makes sense if one assumes that any
temptation cost is borne (only) at the point of agreement, before any actions are taken.
This modeling has the advantage of allowing a straightforward mathematical formulation,
and it is in line with the modeling choices of Fudenberg & Levine (2006).
21There is no need for a counterpart condition BC(iii), since o¤-path play is inconceivable
under a binding contract.
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The informal agreement denition implicitly assumes that i and "i are
commonly known by the parties. We also assume that i and "i di¤er across
players, so that the nature of a deal will vary across negotiation instances.
There is an obvious tension between those two sentences! How can this be
reconciled? We interpret the solution to presume that the parties reveal i
and "i to each other in the course of negotiations. After all, they are mainly
honest.
We admit that this assumption may be quite strong. Sticking to an
agreement may be one thing, revealing private information about i and "i
quite another.22 Neverthless, the assumption is at least consistent with the
idea that players are honest, and it allows us to close the model and to
generate predictions for general games. Extreme as the assumption may be,
we feel it may be a useful benchmark for exploring the deal-making of honest
people.
Note that the predicted agreement in many cases does not change with
i and "i. For example, if i and "i are small enoughand there is a large
enoughdistance between mi(a) and mi(c), for all i, then the players will
simply go for the equal split in all cases.
a; b; c 2 S: Square dealing
It is time to sweep everything together in our key denition. According
to dictionaries, squarecan mean straightforward and honest.It can also
mean (in math) that all sides are equal. Since we assume that most players
are honest and that many deals involve straightforward equal splits, we nd
it appropriate to call our predictions square deals:
Denition: The triple (a; b; c) 2 S3 is a square deal if 1-3 hold:
1. Depending on whether a is a binding contract or an informal agreement,
22In addition, in line with Loewensteins (1996) contention that people underestimate
the impact of visceral factors on their own future behavior(his Proposition 5), we note
that assuming that i knows i is not entirely innocuous.
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a satises conditions BC(i) & BC(ii) or IA(i) & IA(ii) & IA(iii).
2. If a is a binding contract or if i is honest, then bi = ai. If a is an informal
agreement and i is dishonest then he chooses s^i 2 arg maxsi2Simi(ansi),
3. c is an SPE of   using the dollar payo¤s.
It follows from the restrictions we imposed on the underlying game   that
if we consider binding contracts then a square deal always exists. However,
if we consider informal agreements then existence is an issue. The interpre-
tation is natural: taking costs of overcoming temptation and of co-player
opportunism into account, there is no square deal available that can make
both players feel at least as well o¤ as they would be at c. We illustrate
non-existence further in the next section as we analyze in detail the games
we use in our experiment.
3 An Experiment
Is the theory empirically relevant? We shed light on this issue through an
experiment. Next we introduce the games and derive predictions (3.1); then
present the design (3.2) and report results (3.33.4).
3.1 Games and Predictions
We use the lost wallet game (Dufwenberg & Gneezy, 2000) presented in Fig-
ure 2, which may be viewed as a simplied version of the doctor-hospital
game of section 2.1. The lost wallet game is appropriate in that it possesses
several key qualities: It is easy to explain to subjects and implement in the
lab, yet it is rich enough to allow a deal with equal payo¤s. The theory is
simple to apply and generates sharp comparative statics predictions across
treatments (binding contracts vs. informal agreements, and a payo¤ varia-
tion). As regards c 2 S, the game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium
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using the dollar payo¤s. The two players, A and B (named as in the exper-
iment), only have to consider "A and B (and can ignore "B and A), which
substantially reduces complexity regarding unobservables and predictions.23
Figure 2: The Lost Wallet game
Player A chooses In or Out. If he chooses Out, then A and B receive
their respective payo¤s 10  d and d, where d 2 f0; 5g is a parameter (which
in the experiment varies by treatment). Alternatively, if A chooses In then
B divides $30 between them. B keeps x 2 [0; 30] and transfers 30  x to A.
The subgame perfect equilibrium for selsh players is (Out; x = 30), with
resulting dollar payo¤s (5; 5) or (10; 0) depending on d.
In the rest of section 3 we refer to y as the agreed-upon x and to z as
the post-agreement choice of x. Note that with a binding contract z = y by
denition, while with an informal agreement z 6= y is possible.
Now suppose that before playing the game the parties negotiate about
what strategy prole to play. We consider the case where negotiations can
lead to an informal agreement as well as the case when they can lead to
a binding contract. With d 2 f0; 5g the dollar payo¤s following Out are
(5; 5) and (10; 0). We thus get four cases, which we accordingly label IA[5,5],
23For instance, if we had instead used the hospital-doctor game, then "B and A would
also have entered the analysis and made the solution more complex.
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IA[10,0], BC[5,5], and BC[10,0]:
Binding contracts: Reneging is ruled out by denition. This immedi-
ately takes costs of temptations as well as anticipated opportunism out of
the picture. Since 30=2 = 15 > mi(c) for i 2 fA;Bg, the theory predicts
that players will agree on (and then play to) an equal split of 15 for each
player (cf. BC(i)). That is, a = (In; y = 15) and mA(a) = mB(a) = 15.
Informal agreements: For su¢ ciently low "A and B we again obtain
a = (In; y = 15) as the prediction. Too see this clearly, glance at condition
IA(i) and note that, since mi(a) > mi(c), for small enough "i and i we get
mi(a) > mi(c) + i[max
si2Si
mi(ansi) mi(a)] + "i[mi(a) mi(ans^j)]. Hence, we
can set M = 15 > mi(c). However, if either "A or B is large enough we get
either a compensated deal where y 6= 15 or no deal at all. IA(i) implies that
a square deal must compensate player A so that y < 15 when
15  "A(15  0)  A  0 < 10  d() "A > (5 + d)=15: (1)
Suppose (1) holds. Using IA(i), we see that the compensated deal must
allocate A an amount 30  y such that
(30  y)  "A[(30  y)  0]  A  0 = 10  d() 30  y = 10  d
1  "A :
Notice, however, that there is a limit on how much A can get in a square
deal. Because compensation is a direct transfer from B to A, a too high
demand may not be feasible in the sense that B would eventually reject it,
i.e., conditions IA(i) and IA(ii) would fail to hold for B. Specically, player
B is willing to compensate player A if
(30  10  d
1  "A )  "A  0  B(
10  d
1  "A )  d, B 
20  "A(30  d)
10  d : (2)
If this inequality is violated, then there is no informal agreement that
qualies as a square deal. This exemplies well the following key feature of
the theory: An agreement which is a square deal under binding contractual
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arrangement need not be a square deal when it is informal and not explicitly
enforced. With a binding contract, each player perceives that he is better
o¤ than under the conict outcome (since mi(a) > mi(c); i 2 fA;Bg). With
an informal agreement being better o¤means not only comparing mi(a) and
mi(c) but also factoring in the costs of overcoming temptation and of the
belief about the other players opportunism. If "A and B are large enough
it is not possible to compensate both parties, so no informal agreement is
viable as a square deal.
To complete the characterization of square deals for this game similar
calculations need to be made for player B. Suppose the agreement is for him
to choose y. IA(i) implies that a square deal must compensate B so that
y > 15 when
15  "A  0  B  15 < d, B > (15  d)=15; (3)
in which case he must get
y = d+ B  15:
The deal can of course be accepted by player A only if
[30  (d+ B15)]  "A  ([30  (d+ B15)]  0)  A  0  10  d
, B  20 + "A(30  d)
15(1  "A) : (4)
Figure 3 gives a graphical overview of these predictions. In the left panel
d = 5; in the right panel d = 0. Each point corresponds to a player A with
"A and a player B with B. For each case we divide the parameter space
into four di¤erent regions depending on the predicted deals: ES is the region
with an equal split (bounded by (1) and (3)); CA is the region where the
deal compensates player A (between (1) and (2)); CB is the region where the
deal compensates player B (between (3) and (4)); ND denotes all ("A; B)
pairs that do not admit any square deal.
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Figure 3: Predictions
The corresponding regions in the two treatments vary in size and position.
Moreover regions ES and regions ND have di¤erent shapes and nontrivial
overlap. Because of this, predictions will depend on the distribution of types
in our subject population. Ex-ante we have no way of knowing what the
distribution of types might be. However, many distributional assumptions
would admit qualitative conclusions based simply on a comparison of the
relevant region-areas in Figure 3. This would be the case for example for any
distribution that has strictly positive density across [0; 4=5][0; 4=3] which is
non-increasing in directions away from the origin. For any such distribution,
letting ES IA[5;5] denote the region ES in the IA[5,5] panel of Figure 3 etc, we
get the following predictions:
1. Deals compensating B: The region CBIA[5;5] is a strict superset of
(the closure of) the region CBIA[10;0] (in ("A; B)-space). It follows that
CBIA[5;5] is more likely than CBIA[10;0], so deals compensating A should
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be more frequent in IA[5; 5] than in IA[10; 0].
2. Deals compensating A: The area of region CAIA[10;0] is larger than
area of region CAIA[5;5]; moreover CAIA[5;5] is located east of CAIA[10;0]
(in ("A; B)-space). It follows thatCAIA[10;0] is more likely thanCAIA[5;5].
Hence, deals compensating A should be more frequent in IA[10; 0] than
in IA[5; 5].
3. No deals: CAIA[5;5][ CBIA[5;5][ ES IA[5;5] is a strict superset of (the clo-
sure of) CAIA[10;0][ CBIA[10;0][ ES IA[10;0], which implies that NDIA[10;0]
is more likely than NDIA[5;5]. Hence, an outcome with no deal should
be more frequent in IA[10; 0] than in IA[5; 5].
4. Equal split deals: The area of CAIA[5;5] is smaller than the area of
ES IA[5;5]; moreover, CAIA[5;5] is located east of ES IA[5;5]. It follows that
ES IA[5;5] is more likely than CAIA[5;5]. By similar reasoning, ES IA[5;5]
is more likely than CBIA[5;5], and ES IA[10;0] is more likely than either
of CAIA[10;0] and CBIA[10;0]. Hence, in each treatment, equal split deals
should be more frequent than any particular kind of deals compensating
one of the parties.24
3.2 Design & Procedures
The experiment was computerized and conducted at the University of Ari-
zonas Economic Science Laboratory. The software was written in Visual
Basic 6. In total, 204 undergraduate students participated as subjects; the
sessions and participation is summarized in Table 7 in Appendix A. Subjects
played one game no repetitions and were then privately paid.
Once all subjects were seated at computer terminals separated by pri-
vacy dividers, hard copies of instructions were handed out (see Appendix
B) and subjects were given 10-15 minutes to read them. When everyone
24The nontrivial overlap of the ES regions does not yield clear-cut predictions for be-
tween treatment comparison of equal split deals.
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had nished reading, the instructions were also read out loud. After this,
the experimenters answered any questions individually. The software then
started up with a set of comprehension questions. Every subject had to get
all answers correct before the experiment proceeded further.
Our theory presumes pre-play negotiation but leaves the strategic details
of this process implicit, reected only through the solution concept. In the
lab, however, one has to o¤er some specic format for the haggling. We chose
an alternating-o¤er structure. After being acquainted with game details, and
learning their respective roles as player A or player B, the subjects could send
proposals back and forth and agree on how to play. One person from each
pair was randomly selected to make an opening proposal. Each proposal
specied whether player A would choose In or Out, and, conditional on In,
the amount, y, that player B would keep. The party who received a proposal
could accept it, make a counter-proposal, or disagree and quit negotiating.
Acceptance of a proposal led to an agreement. This ended the negotiations
and a message saying either Player A chooses OUTor, for, e.g., y = 18,
Player A chooses IN and Player B keeps $18 and gives $12 to Player A
appeared on the pairs computer screens. A counter-proposal reversed the
negotiation roles while a disagreement terminated the negotiation process.
There was no limit imposed neither on the length of negotiations nor on the
time within which a subject had to submit his decision.
We implemented a 2  2 design, varying the type of agreement, to be
either a binding contract or an informal agreement, and the payo¤ following
option Out to be either (10; 0) or (5; 5). We refer to the treatments as
IA[5,5], IA[10,0], BC[5,5], and BC[10,0], in accordance with the cases of
section 3.1. If an informal agreement was made, or if no agreement was made,
the paired subjects entered the game stage where they were free to make any
decisions. In the BC-treatments the agreements from the negotiation stage
were automatically implemented.
On average, a session lasted about 50 minutes. The average nal payment
was $19.90, including a $5 show-up fee.
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3.3 Main Results
In this section we present a series of results regarding specic tests of our
theory. This is then followed (in section 3.4) by a few other observations of
striking data patterns for which our theory has no direct implications.
Table 1 presents raw data on negotiated agreements (y) and path of play.25
In the IA-treatments, the path of play is described by the amount kept (z)
by player B, implying that A chose In, or by indicating that A chose Out
(and hence implying that B had no decision to make in the game). In the
BC-treatments, z = y by denition.
Agreement formation
Table 1 shows that apart from two cases in BC[5,5] all other pairs of
subjects reached an agreement. This is in line with the theory in the BC-
treatments. All binding contracts involved player A choosing In.
In the IA-treatments temptations or high suspicion of dishonesty could
have led to disagreements, but this did not happen. 100% of our subject-
pairs formed an agreement. From the vantage point of our theory, this would
suggest that the subjectsBs and "As are relatively low.26 Finally, all but
one informal agreements involved player A choosing In.27
Do players honor agreements?
Table 2, distilled from Table 1, provides a summary of reached agreements
and subsequent behavior. The rst column, Obs, denotes the number of
subject pairs who participated in a given treatment. The second column,
Agr, provides the count of reached agreements which we further split (in
subsequent columns) into what these agreements prescribe that players A
and B will do. For As we compare the number of subjects who agreed on a
25Descriptive statistics could be found in Appendix A.
26Due to lack of disagreements in the data we cannot perform a meaningful test of our
prediction involving no deals.
27One pair in IA[5,5] agreed on Out, then Player A chose In and Player B kept 15.
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Table 1: Raw data on agreements and path of play
IA[10,0] IA[5,5] BC[10,0] BC[5,5]
y z y z y = z y = z
0 15 15 15 14 14
10 20 15 15 15 15
13 18 15 15 15 15
15 15 15 15 15 15
15 15 15 15 15 15
15 15 15 15 15 15
15 15 15 15 15 15
15 15 15 15 15 15
15 15 15 15 15 15
15 15 15 15 15 15
15 15 15 15 15 15
15 15 15 16 15 15
15 15 15 17 15 15
15 15 15 25 15 15
15 15 15 20 15 15
15 15 15 30 15 15
15 15 15 30 15 15
15 15 15 30 15 15
15 15 16 16 15 15
15 15 16 20 15 15
15 20 17 15 15 15
15 30 18 18 15 16
15 30 18 18 15 17
15 Out 20 20 20 20
20 20 20
24 22 Disagr.
Out 15 Disagr.
Note: y refers to the agreed-upon amount that player B would keep and z to the
amount B actually kept.
Highlighted in bold are all observations that di¤er from 15.
certain deal which involved them choosing In (see column Agreed to In)
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Table 2: Agreements and honesty
Treat. Obs Agr Player A Player B
Agreed to In Chose In z < y z = y z > y
IA[10,0] 24 24 24 23 0 17 6
IA[5,5] 27 27 26 27 2 16 8
BC[10,0] 24 24 24 24
BC[5,5] 27 25 25 25
Note: In IA[5,5] one pair has agreed on player A choosing Out. Following this player A
chose In and player B kept $15.
with the number who indeed chose In (column Chose In). For example,
in the IA[10,0] treatment, presented in the rst row, twenty-four As agreed
to choose In, out of which twenty-three subsequently honored the agreement
and chose In. In IA[5,5] twenty-six As agreed on In, all twenty-six indeed
chose In. The twenty-seventh observation is the subjects who agreed to
choose Out but in the end chose In. Finally, in the rightmost part of the
table we list the number of Bs for whom the amount they kept (z) was
smaller than, equal, or greater than the agreed upon amount (y). Naturally,
in the BC-treatments, presented in the two bottom rows, there is no variation
between the agreement and observed behavior of either player.
Table 2 shows that a majority of agreements were indeed honored. In all
cases where player A agreed to choose In, he indeed did so. Bs face a direct
temptation to renege. Nevertheless, the proportion of Bs who honored the
agreement is quite high. In IA[10,0] 74% of Bs did exactly as they agreed
and in IA[5,5] the proportion was slightly lower at 64%.28
What about the subjects who reneged? Do they represent the selsh-
fringe (captured by "i) as assumed by our theory? Recall that a player B
who reneges on the agreement should act in his best self-interest by keeping
28Unlike Player As, Player Bs cost themselves a lot of money by not reneging. In the
IA[10,0] treatment Player Bs who lived up to their agreements earned on average $15
but could have earned as much as $30! In treatment IA[5,5] Player Bs earned on average
$16.55 which means they left on average $14.35 on the table.
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all $30. Out of sixteen subjects who reneged (about 10% of all player Bs),
ve kept everything (i.e. 31% for those who reneged). The remaining eleven
gave their paired player As a non-zero amount.29
Equal splits & e¤ect of d
The theory makes the following predictions: First, in the BC-treatments sub-
jects will agree on equal splits and there will be no sensitivity to d. Second,
in IA-treatments equal splits will be more frequent than deals compensating
playerA, and also more frequent than deals compensating playerB. Third, in
IA[5,5], deals compensating B will be more frequent and deals compensating
A less frequent than in IA[10,0].
Table 3: Agreements
Treat. y < 15 y = 15 y > 15
BC[10,0] 1 22 1
BC[5,5] 1 20 4
IA[10,0] 3 21 0
IA[5,5] 0 18 8
Table 3 categorizes data on individual agreements with respect to equal
splits. In line with the rst two predictions, in all treatments (BC and IA),
equal splits (y = 15) are the most frequent agreements. We observe 86%
pairs in the BC-treatments agree on the equal split and 78% pairs in the IA-
treatments. There is a relatively small number of data points on compensated
deals. Nevertheless, we nd statistical support for the remaining predictions
regarding treatment comparisons: First, in the BC-treatments we observe
only a few deals that are not equal splits and nd that binding contracts are
not sensitive to variation in payo¤s following Out, i.e., there is no statistical
29We discuss these subjects further in a subsequent section.
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di¤erence in frequencies presented in the rst two rows of Table 3 (two-
sided Fishers exact test has p value = 0:58). Second, when it comes to
compensated deals (y 6= 15), there is a distinct pattern: In IA[10,0] all
pairs agree on player B keeping at least $15 (three pairs or 12.5% of the
sample agreed on y < 15) while in IA[5,5] all pairs agree on B keeping
at most $15 (eight pairs or 30.7% of the sample agreed on y > 15). The
equality of distributions is rejected at 1% level (two-sided Fishers exact test
has p value = 0:001).30 Informal agreements thus show sensitivity in the
predicted direction: As (Bs) get compensated more (less) often when their
payo¤ following Out increases (decreases).
3.4 Additional Observations
As seen in section 3.3, the theory holds up rather well. However, the data
exhibits a few seemingly systematic patterns which are either at odds with
the theory, or not explicitly predicted. This section highlights three such
occurrences that we nd intuitively striking. We allow ourselves some leeway
commenting on what may be going on.
Reneging and semi-honesty
Our rst comment belongs to subjects who reneged but did not keep all
$30. Such behavior lies outside the tight boundaries of our simple model. It
is not easy to judge whether these subjects acted in an honest or a dishonest
manner. On one hand, they did break the agreement; on the other hand,
they still showed concern for their respective player As by sending them
some money. Perhaps one might refer to them as semi-honest.
What should we think of their behavior? In IA[10,0] three pairs nego-
tiated compensated deals, according to which Bs were supposed to keep
y = 0; 10; and 13. Following each of those deals, Bs reneged by shading
30If one runs a test on just the observations for which y 6= 15, the results are virtually
the same. For BC distributions the p value is 0:524, for IA distributions it is 0:006.
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the agreed-on amount by some fraction and keeping z = 15; 20; and 18, re-
spectively. It seems as if these semi-honest Bs had di¤erent deals in mind 
ones that compensate them instead. The remaining data are in line with this
story. In IA[5,5] we observe eight compensated deals (y = 16; 17; and 24)
but this time only three of the Bs reneged (z = 20; 15; and 22, respectively).
Each of the three subjects gave his matched player A a positive amount. In
two of those cases B actually gave A more money than what they agreed on!
The selsh fringe
Next let us examine the behavior of player B subjects who have kept all
$30 for themselves. Only ve subjects fall into this category. It might nev-
ertheless be interesting to look at the negotiation patterns of these subjects.
If their behavior was planned then they knew at the point of the agreement
that they were going to renege. One would think that their main objective
would then be to maximize the chances that their paired player A chooses
In. What is the most likely behavior to do the job?
Looking at the data all ve Bs in question ended up agreeing on an
equal split. Three of them accepted the opening equal split proposals made
by their respective As. One of them proposed an equal split which was
accepted. And the last one initially proposed $25 for himself but that was
rejected and countered with an equal split. This B accepted.
Beware of people who do not goof around! The selsh fringe in our data
set hide among the subjects who strike 50/50 deals. We nd it intriguing
that there thus seem to be some degree of conformity in the community of
condence tricksters. An analogous nding, for a di¤erent strategic setting
with asymmetric information, is reported by Charness & Dufwenberg (2011;
see Section III.C)
Bargaining delay
Our next remark concerns the following systematic pattern of bargaining
delay. Namely, most of the time the parties agree quickly. However, in almost
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all instances where the negotiating proceeds several rounds, this happens in
the BC-treatments and involves some player who demands more than $15.
To illustrate this, in Table 4 we list the sequences of proposal exchange for
all deals that gave player B more money in treatments BC[5,5] and IA[5,5].
Notice that in BC[5,5] compensated deals involved a struggle between the
paired subjects, with one pair negotiating for fteen periods. In contrast, the
compensated deals in IA[5,5] were negotiated in early rounds. We nd the
same pattern for other departures from equal split in BC[10,0] and IA[10,0]
(see Table 5 which presents data on the length of negotiations broken down
by nal agreement y). Agreements that depart from equal splits in the BC-
treatments were hard bargains while this is not the case in the IA-treatments.
Why do we observe this bargaining delay with informal agreements but
not with binding contracts? Our intuition is as follows. In the BC-treatments
a square deal is for the players to split the $30 right down the middle. On
the other hand, in the IA-treatments any y could be part of a possible square
deal. If we suppose that the only legitimate proposals are those that could
become a part of a square deal, then we might expect these o¤ers to be
accepted more easily than others. These data patterns suggest an auxiliary
observation that square deals form smoothly and without much delay. On
the other hand, agreements that are not square deals must have involved
illegitimate proposals and have led to conict and longer o¤er-exchanges.
There are multiple ways of evaluating this conjecture. One is in terms of
the length of negotiations. Table 5 provides clear support for the argument
suggested above. The average length of negotiations for illegitimate proposals
(in the BC-treatments when y 6= 15) is distinctly longer, 4.5-7 rounds, than
for legitimate proposals, 1.048-1.818.31
Another way of looking at the same issue is by comparing acceptance
rates for the initial proposals.32 Table 6 gives the summary of the data. One
can see that the acceptance rate for initial proposals that are equal splits (top
31The di¤erence is statistically signicant; p=0.0005 on an Epps-Singleton test.
32Only for the initial o¤ers we are guaranteed to have independent observations.
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Table 4: Sequences of proposals
IA[5,5] BC[5,5]
Obs: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4
Op. Prop.: B B A A B B A A B B B B
Rnd: 1 16 20 17 18 16 20 20 24 20 20 20 20
2 15 18 15 15 15
3 18 17 18 20
4 16 16 16 10
5 18 20
6 17 15
7 18 20
8 15 15
9 18 20
10 16 15
11 18 20
12 17 15
13 18 20
14 Out
15 17
Agreem.: 16 16 17 18 18 20 20 24 16 17 20 20
Note: Row Op. Prop:lists the player (A or B) who opened the negotiations.
Sequences of proposal-exchange run from top to bottom. E.g., sequence 2 in IA[5,5]
reads as follows: player B made the rst proposal to keep 20; player A countered with
15; player B rejected this and suggested he keeps 18; then player A went up to 16; and
this was accepted by player B.
row) is higher than for rest of the proposals (bottom row). However, even
proposals that are not equal splits could be legitimate in the IA-treatments
because they may according to the theory reect subjects "As and Bs.
The acceptance rate for these is still substantially higher (50%) than for
their counterparts in the BC-treatments (0-10%). All in all, the di¤erence in
the acceptance rate between illegitimate proposals (found only in treatments
BC[10,0] and BC[5,5]) and legitimate proposals is statistically signicant
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Table 5: Average length of negotiations
IA[10,0] IA[5,5] BC[10,0] BC[5,5]
y = 15 1.048 1.5 1.818 1.55
(0.218),{21} (0.985),{18} (1.79),{22} (1.791),{20}
y 6= 15 1.667 1.556 4.5 7
(1.155),{3} (1.014),{9} (2.121),{2} (6.52),{5}
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses; number of observations are in braces; two
cases in BC[5,5] where subjects failed to reach an agreement are excluded.
Table 6: Acceptance rates of initial proposals
IA[10,0] IA[5,5] BC[10,0] BC[5,5]
Op. proposal = 15 20/20 13/15 14/15 16/17
100% 86.7% 93.3% 94.1%
Op. proposal 6= 15 2/4 6/12 0/9 1/10
50% 50% 0% 10%
(Fishers exact test has p-value = 0:000). This evidence also suggests that
the departures from equal splits in the BC-treatments are typically found
unjustied and become hard bargains. The resulting deals are then likely
driven by an imbalance in subjectspatience and obstinacy.
Informal agreements a¤ect play
Our experimental goal is to test our theory, and since it concerns deal-
making the design always includes opportunities for informal agreements or
binding contracts. However, when presenting the paper we were sometimes
asked whether Bs sharing behavior resembles what would happen without
pre-play deal-making. A comparison with preceding LostWallet game studies
(without pre-play negotiation) indicates this is not the case. Servátka &
Vadoviµc (2009) (S&V) have treatments with d = 0 and d = 5 and we focus
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on their data.33 The comparison is not perfect as the available money for
the second-mover to split was $20, not $30, but with that caveat we can
record the following di¤erences most of which are statistically signicant (we
give proportions only but number of observations and formal test results are
available on request):
Our Bs choose more equal splits than S&Vs (78% vs 35% for the [10,0]-
treatments); 50% vs 31% for the [5,5]-treatments). Our Bs give zero (z = 0)
less often than S&Vs (9% vs 38% for [10,0]; 12% vs 31% for [5,5]). Our Bs
give more than S&Vs (the average amounts given, measured as percentages
of the available pie, are 44% vs 31% for [10,0]; 39% vs 26% for [5,5]).
4 Discussion
Informal agreements have been given rather scant attention in economic the-
ory. Are they economically unimportant? Couldnt agents simply always
rely on binding contracts to achieve good partnership outcomes? We do not
think so for several reasons.
First, binding contracts may be infeasible. Consider two impatient sher-
men who live in a developing country where neither courts nor policemen are
reliable. It may be impossible to draft a binding contract which regulates the
shermens access to a nearby lake. Does this mean that they are destined
to ine¢ cient excessive depletion of the sh stock? Even if the interaction is
repeated, classical theory would say yes (because of the impatience). How-
ever, according to our theory, the answer may be no, if the shermen rely on
an informal agreement.
Second, binding contracts may be illegal. Think of collusion in a one-
shot government procurement auction in industrial countries. Courts exist
and police can be relied on, yet bid rigging would not be legal. Does that
imply that the outcome will conform with standard auction theory, where
33Similar conclusions would be reached if we considered the data of Dufwenberg &
Gneezy (2000), Charness, Haruvy & Sonsino (2007), or Cox, Servátka & Vadoviµc (2010).
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the competing rms maximize prot taking each othersactions as given?
Perhaps not. Suppose the rm representatives meet in a bar, have a pint,
shake hands, and agree to collude. Will this stick? If the representatives
take pride in standing by their word, the answer may be yes.
Third, even if binding contracts are feasible in principle (as they perhaps
usually are) they may be costly. A guy meets a girl and they play the (one-
shot, sequential) game of life with decisions on kids, who works, divorce,
alimony, etc. A binding contract may involve signicant costs ranging from
lawyers fees to unforeseen contingencies to awkward feelings regarding le-
gal chit-chat during courtship. Perhaps, instead, the couple will shun the
formalities, look one another in the eye, and promise to be faithful forever?
Just how compelling are these examples? Under which circumstances will
informal agreements work? How will the terms be structured? How will the
deals shape subsequent play? How do the outcomes compare to those that
would obtain under a binding contract? Answers require theory.
We have proposed a theory of deal-making which covers informal agree-
ments and binding contracts as special cases. We suggest that people who
deep down may be motivated in complicated, rich, and hard-to-pin-down-in-
mathematical-formulae ways do not engage in any elaborate utility calculus
when striking deals. They rather focus on easy-to-observe data, namely dol-
lars gained. Inspired by Binmore et als so-called deal-me-out solution, we
assume that people agree to split dollar gains equally, as long as each person
is thereby made better o¤ than if the negotiations stranded.
A key assumption is that most people are honest. Informal agreements
therefore work in similar ways as binding contracts. However, the two are not
interchangeable. With informal agreements players incur costs of overcoming
temptation and of co-player opportunism. This inuences playersperception
of whether a deal makes them better o¤. These concerns are irrelevant with
binding contracts. Therefore, our theory generates systematic testable pre-
dicted di¤erences between the shapes and impact of informal agreements and
binding contracts. We ran an experiment to evaluate the empirical relevance
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of these predictions, and found considerable support.
We hope this will inspire economists to apply our model, to study various
economic settings where people strike deals, be they informal or binding.
That said, we conclude by noting a few issues we did not address so far. First,
in context where both informal agreements and binding contracts are feasible,
one may wish to endogenize the choice between the two. So far we assumed
the feasible deals to involve one or the other. Second, one may imagine deals
that regulate some but not all choices, and so would be intermediate to the
polar cases of an informal agreement and a binding contract. Our framework
may be adequate for exploring such incomplete contracts. Third, in many
contexts material costs and revenues are not as readily observable as our
above account (with given mi functions) may suggest. For example, how
should considerations of unobserved cost-of-e¤ort or consumer surplus be
dealt with? Fourth, (as discussed in section 2.2) even when dollar payo¤s are
given, 50/50 splits may not be focal in all setting and a rened theory may
consider alternatives. Fifth, we limited attention to games with two players,
but many situations involve multiple bargaining parties. We plan to explore
these extentions in future work.
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Appendix
A Session overview
Table 7: Treatments
Tr. Name Type of Agreement Outside Opt. Session # of subj.
IA[10,0] Informal [10,0] Sess. 1 20
IA[10,0] Informal [10,0] Sess. 2 28
IA[5,5] Informal [5,5] Sess. 1 28
IA[5,5] Informal [5,5] Sess. 2 26
BC[10,0] Binding [10,0] Sess. 1 & 2 10
BC[10,0] Binding [10,0] Sess. 3 28
BC[5,5] Binding [5,5] Sess. 1 30
BC[5,5] Binding [5,5] Sess. 2 24
Table 8: Descriptive statistics
Tr. Obs. Agreement Decisions
Agreed Pl. A: In Pl. B: y Pl. A: In Pl. B: y
(%) (%) (st. dev.) (%) (st. dev.)
IA[10,0] 24 24 24 14.08 23 16.13
(100) (100) (3.19) (96) (5.65)
IA[5,5] 26 26 25 16.11 26 18.54
(100) (96) (2.321) (100) (4.99)
BC[10,0] 24 24 24 15.17 24 15.17
(100) (100) (1.05) (100) (1.05)
BC[5,5] 27 25 25 15.48 25 15.48
(93) (100) (1.45) (100) (1.45)
Note: In IA[10,0] one pair has agreed that player A chooses Out. Following this player
A chose In and player B kept $15. In only two instances, both in BC[5,5], subjects have
disagreed. In both cases player As chose In, player Bs kept $20 and $30 respectively.
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B Instructions
In what follows we present the universal version of the instructions in which
{... or ...} always contains two di¤erent versions of the text that was used
appropriately in di¤erent treatments.
Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk with
each other for the duration of the experiment. If you have a question after we
nish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter
will approach you and answer your question in private.
You will receive $5 for participating in this experiment. You may also re-
ceive additional money, depending on the choices made (as described below).
Your earnings will be paid to you in cash individually and privately.
During the session, you will be paired with another person. However, no
participant will ever know the identity of the person he or she is paired with.
In the experiment, one person from each pair will be randomly selected
to be Player A and the other to be Player B. The players will interact in
two stages: 1. The Negotiation Stage and 2. The Game. In the negotiation
stage the players can form an agreement about how to play the game. Any
agreement reached in the negotiation stage { will or will not} be enforced and
the players {will have to play according to the agreement or be free to make
any decisions} in the game that follows. The decisions in the negotiation
stage will determine how much each of the players earns in the experiment.
We next describe rst the game and then the negotiation stage that pre-
cedes it.
The Game
Player A moves rst and chooses either IN or OUT by clicking a button
labeled either INor OUT.
Player B moves second:
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 If Player A chose OUT, then the game ends. Player A receives { $5 or
$10} and Player B receives { $5 or $0} .
 If Player A chose IN, then Player B splits $30 between the two of them:
Player B keeps $x and gives $30-x to Player A, choosing x such that
$0  x  $30.
The Negotiation Stage
Before the game is played the players can form an agreement about how
to play the game. One player from each pair will be randomly selected to
make the rst proposal and the other player will be asked to respond to it.
A proposal describes the choices of Player A and Player B in the game.
It could be:
Player A chooses OUT
or it could be
Player A chooses IN and
Player B keeps $x and gives $30 x to Player A.
The proposal is sent to the other player by clicking on the Submit
button. The responding player observes the proposal and chooses one of the
following three options:
 Agree with the proposal by clicking on the button Agree.In this case
an agreement is formed and { will or will not} be enforced.
 Make a counter-proposal by clicking on the button Make a counter-
proposal.This reverses the roles of the players in the negotiation. Now,
the player who clicked this button makes a new proposal and sends it to
the other player. The other player will then have the chance to respond
by either agreeing with the proposal, or making a counter-proposal, or
disagreeing.
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 Disagree and quit negotiating by clicking on the button Disagree and
quit negotiating.In this case no agreement is reached and negotiations
terminate. Both players proceed to play the game.
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